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Governments in provinces relying on natural resource commodities for significant amounts of revenue face the 
distinct challenge of unpredictably fluctuating budget circumstances. As politicians routinely point out, much 
of that challenge is in the volatility of global commodity prices. But a big part of it is actually the policies of the 
governments themselves. 
In fact, when effects of commodity prices, economic cycles and fiscal policy are separated from one another, one 
of the biggest impacts on government debt over the last 30 years in Canada’s four resource-dependent provinces 
— Alberta, Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Newfoundland and Labrador — has been government policy. While 
years of booming economies have offset years of busts, virtually all the debt racked up by these provinces over 
more than three decades has been a combination of movements in commodity prices and political decisions. 
In Alberta, over three periods since the early 1980s, totalling more than 15 years cumulatively, it was policy — not 
energy prices or economic factors — that had the biggest impact on government debt levels. From 1988–89 to 
1993–94, Progressive Conservative policies were the biggest factor in raising Alberta’s debt, and from 1995–96 to 
1999–2000, the Klein government’s policies were the biggest factor in reducing Alberta’s debt. The policies of then 
premier Ralph Klein also played the biggest role in reducing debt from 2001–02 to 2003–04, while from 2006–07 
to 2013–14, the policies of the Stelmach and Redford governments outweighed economic and commodity-price 
effects in ways that both reduced debt at times, and then raised it again. Over the entire period from 1982–84 to 
2013–14, PC government policy increased Alberta’s debt ratio by 9.5 percentage points of GDP, while the business 
cycle decreased it by only one percentage point, and the commodity-price cycle decreased it by only 1.9 points.
In Saskatchewan, the policy component raised the provincial debt ratio by 11.6 percentage points of provincial 
GDP from 1982–84 to 2013–14. The business cycle added 1.5 points and the commodity-price cycle decreased 
the debt ratio by 6.1 points. Ironically, given assumptions about party proclivities, it was Progressive Conservative 
government policies that added most of that debt, and NDP government policies that made the most progress in 
reducing it. 
In Newfoundland and Labrador, where a reliance on resource revenue is a more recent phenomenon, the policies 
of both PC and Liberal governments were almost indistinguishable, together reducing the debt ratio by 9.8 
percentage points of GDP from 1982–84 to 2013–14, while the effect of commodity prices reduced it by 16.9 
percentage points. But in B.C., government policy was, as in the other western provinces, the biggest factor on 
the debt ratio: decreasing it by 12.5 percentage points of GDP, compared to the increase of two points caused by 
economic cycles, and the reduction of 4.9 percentage points caused by commodity prices.
Whatever the politicians in resource-dependent provinces say about their unpredictable budgeting challenges, 
clearly policy can have the biggest impact on debt accumulation. As it happens, that is also the one factor over 
which those politicians actually have total control. 
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11. INTRODUCTION
Having access to the revenues generated by the exploitation of fossil fuels and other natural 
resources carries with it both positive and negative consequences for provincial government budgets. 
On the one hand, royalties, land sales and fees provide governments with sometimes very large 
revenues that can be used to finance the provision of health care, education and other vital public 
services without the need for usurious tax rates on personal or corporate incomes. On the other 
hand, these revenues are often volatile and unpredictable, making it a risky budgeting strategy to 
rely on them to fund critical programs in health, education and social welfare.
In Canada, four provinces — Newfoundland and Labrador, Alberta, Saskatchewan and British 
Columbia — enjoy the benefits and suffer the risks of substantial amounts of resource revenues. 
Alberta and Saskatchewan have a long history of collecting significant amounts of revenue from the 
exploitation of natural resources. Since 2000–01, Alberta and Saskatchewan have relied on natural 
resource revenues to account for an average of 29 and 23 per cent of total revenue respectively. 
British Columbia’s reliance on resource revenues has grown over time but the reliance is smaller 
than in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Since 2000–01, B.C. has relied on these revenues to account for 
12 per cent of total revenues, but the provincial government has made clear its hopes of increasing 
the amount of revenue it collects from this source. Newfoundland and Labrador has long collected 
revenues from natural resources, but the amounts were very small prior to 1992 when significant 
amounts of revenue began to flow to provincial coffers as a result of the development of offshore 
oilfields. Since 2000–01, an average of 22 per cent of total revenue collected by the province has 
come from natural resource revenues. 
This is the second of a series of reports on the public finances of Canadian provinces.1 This report 
uses public accounts data for the period 1980–81 to 2013–14 to summarize, describe and analyze 
the finances of the governments of Alberta, Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Newfoundland and 
Labrador. Relying on the simple arithmetic of debt accumulation implied by the government budget 
constraint, the sources of debt accumulation are identified, and inform a discussion of how much 
of the change in provincial debt can be laid at the feet of policy choices as opposed to economic 
conditions. 
Memories of the price Canadians paid in the past when their governments had accumulated too 
much debt are stoking recent concerns that these costs— such as slower economic growth, higher 
interest rates, higher tax rates and cuts to social programs — might need to be paid yet again. In 
the four provinces considered here, the concern is heightened by the fact the fiscal sustainability 
of health care, education and other key provincial programs hinges on swings in internationally 
determined commodity price fluctuations. Understanding the separate roles of these exogenous 
shocks, as opposed to policy-induced changes in debt, is therefore of particular interest to citizens 
in these provinces. It is also useful to compare and contrast the policy choices made by these four 
provinces in responding to changes in economic conditions as they all face somewhat similar 
challenges. Of additional interest is the fact these provinces have significantly different political 
histories since 1980.
This paper will also contribute to the broader literature examining provincial budgets by providing 
a data set describing the finances of Alberta, Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Newfoundland 
1 
The first of the series examined the finances of Ontario and Quebec. See Ronald Kneebone and Margarita Wilkins, “Who, 
or What, is to Blame for the Accumulation of Debt in Ontario and Quebec (And What will it Take to Stop the Bleeding?),” 
University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 7, 17 (July 2014). 
2and Labrador for the period from 1980–81 to 2013–14. As we explain in Section 2, Statistics Canada 
has halted, with data for 2008–09, the publication of a data series describing details of provincial 
government finances. Unless or until this data series is continued, analysts have nothing with which 
to measure the influence on provincial government finances of the recession of 2008–09 and the 
halting recovery that has followed. By providing these data we hope to facilitate further work on 
important questions concerning provincial government finances.
2. THE DATA
A long time series of useful data on provincial government finances is difficult to obtain. Statistics 
Canada’s Financial Management System (FMS) sources data contained in the public accounts 
published by each provincial government. The data reported in the FMS represent an attempt to 
impose a certain degree of uniformity on the public accounts data published by each province, an 
effort that Statistics Canada notes can never be complete.2 Moreover, the advantage of using data 
that impose some degree of uniformity on public accounts data is offset by certain drawbacks to the 
accounting conventions FMS employs. In particular, the royalty revenue that provincial governments 
collect from the sale of natural resources is not reported separately in the FMS data. Rather, these 
revenues are included in the category of “investment income” and so cannot be distinguished from 
the income provincial governments earn from financial assets and other sorts of investments. This 
is problematic given the importance of royalty income for the finances of the provinces we are 
considering in this paper. The usefulness of FMS data is also severely limited by the fact that the 
information they provide on provincial finances ends in 2008–09.3 To understand and identify the 
effects of the recent recession and the period of recovery since 2008–09 therefore requires accessing 
a different data set.4
Information on provincial government finances is drawn from provincial public accounts.5 A 
challenge associated with using these data is that they employ accounting standards and approaches 
that differ across provinces and change over time. A distinct advantage is that the public accounts 
identify royalty and other income derived from the sale of natural resources as a revenue category 
2 For a discussion, see Financial Management System (FMS), Statistics Canada, 2009, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/
pub/68f0023x/68f0023x2006001-eng.pdf).
3 
Statistics Canada is moving to a new approach to measuring government financial statistics and has indicated that it intends 
to soon begin publishing data based on its new accounting framework starting with fiscal year 2008-09. We are not aware of 
any statement suggesting that a revision to historical data will accompany the adoption of the new accounting framework.
4 
As noted by Kneebone and Wilkins (“Who, or What”), another source of information on provincial government finances is 
available from Statistics Canada’s Provincial Economic Accounts (PEA). These data differ from the FMS data by reporting 
on a calendar-year, rather than fiscal-year basis and by reporting on different aggregates of provincial finances. Thus, while 
the FMS data report provincial spending on functional categories such as health, education and social services, the PEA 
data report on the much broader category of “net current expenditures on goods and services.” As part of the goal of this 
paper is to identify the implications of debt reduction on spending on items such as health and education, the PEA data are 
less useful. Like the FMS data, the PEA data set is also limited by having been terminated by Statistics Canada, with the 
last year of data provided being 2009.
5 The Appendix presents the data on provincial government revenues and expenditures used in this paper. Simply collecting 
these data proved challenging. Enthusiastic support is added to the complaint recently expressed by Colin Busby and 
William Robson over the lack of transparency and consistency in provincial government financial accounting. See 
“Credibility on the (Bottom) Line: The Fiscal Accountability of Canada’s Senior Governments, 2013,” Commentary No. 
404 (C.D. Howe Institute, March 2014). Some provincial governments are themselves responding to the lack of transparency 
in their public accounts and the inability to make comparisons across provinces. See, for example: Canada. Saskatchewan. 
Provincial Auditor, The Need to Change – Modernizing Government Budgeting and Financial Reporting in Saskatchewan, 
2013 Special Report (2013).
3separate from investment income. In ways we describe below, this allows us to isolate the influence 
on provincial budgets of fluctuations in commodity prices that are largely determined outside of 
Canada. 
This paper focuses on the period from 1981–82 to 2013–14.6 This enables the analysis to capture of 
the effects on provincial finances of three major recessions (1981–82, 1990–91 and 2008–09), two 
periods of strong economic growth (in the late 1980s and again in the early 2000s), and the impact 
on provincial finances of the economic recovery since the end of the 2008–09 recession. The long 
time series also enables us to consider the potential influence on provincial finances of the politics of 
elected governments.
It is worth noting that the Fiscal Reference Tables (FRT) published by the federal Department of 
Finance also present data from provincial public accounts and largely adopt the practice of not 
trying to enforce uniformity in provincial accounting. The FRT, however, do not offer a breakdown 
of total spending and total revenue into sub-categories. Thus, to obtain data on revenue collected by 
provincial governments by type (personal and corporate income taxes, retail sales taxes, etc.), and 
to determine program spending by program (health, education, social services, etc.), one must go 
directly to the public accounts of individual provinces. Accessing this finer gradation of spending 
and revenue is important to understanding the sources of revenue and spending changes and is also 
important for identifying, as is done below, what portions of revenue and spending changes are due 
to the business cycle as opposed to policy choices.
3. THE OPERATING ACCOUNT AND THE ACCUMULATED DEFICIT
It is important to emphasize that the focus of this study is only on that portion of provincial budgets 
we will refer to as the government’s operating account. The operating account is intended to 
measure the cost of ongoing programs and services and the amount of revenue collected for the 
purpose of financing those costs. It excludes capital expenses and revenues raised to finance capital 
expenditures. The deficit of the operating account defines the excess of spending on government 
goods and services intended for current consumption over current revenue. The accumulation of 
such deficits over time defines what is commonly referred to as the accumulated deficit. 
The ratio of accumulated deficits to GDP is different from what governments report as their net 
debt. Net debt is a measure that includes in its calculation the implications of extraordinary additions 
to debt and debt incurred to finance capital expenditures.7 Net debt, then, represents a broader 
definition of the government’s debt than the accumulated borrowing required to pay for current 
expenditures. 
In provinces where the revenue collected from the exploitation of natural resources is large — as is 
the case for the four provinces considered here — an interesting question is whether those revenues 
ought to be considered part of any calculation of the operating balance. To the extent that resource 
6 
As described below, the approach involves ratios of debt to GDP. The choice of time span therefore reflects in part the 
availability of a consistent data series on provincial GDP. Calendar-year values of provincial GDP are available to 2013 
(sources are provided below) and these are used to produce fiscal-year values for 1981–82 to 2012–13. Calendar-year data on 
provincial GDP for 2014 are not yet available and so the calendar value for 2013 is used to represent fiscal year 2013–14. 
7 In Alberta, for example, we omit expenditures due to the province’s capital plan. In 2012–13, for example, $5.1 billion of 
spending on capital investments in Alberta is not considered part of that province’s operating account. This spending would 
add to the provincial net debt but would not impact the accumulated deficit of the operating account.
4revenues represent monetized physical capital, one might argue they are properly allocated to a 
capital account and so should be removed from our consideration of the operating account. 
While this view would find favour among economists, it is not an approach Canadian provincial 
governments have typically taken. Only rarely have any of the four provinces being considered 
here budgeted in a way that would suggest they treat natural resource revenue as anything other 
than current income. Alberta established the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (AHSTF) in 
1976, but the provincial government’s commitment to depositing resource revenues into the fund 
has rarely survived revenue demands resulting from economic downturns and spending needs.8 
After first reducing, in 1982, the commitment to deposit 30 per cent of natural resource revenues 
into the AHSTF to 15 per cent, the government halted all deposits between 1987–88 and 2004–05. 
After three straight years of additions to the AHSTF in an effort to maintain its real value, none 
has been made since 2007–08 when the effects of the most recent recession were first felt. British 
Columbia established a savings fund (the British Columbia Endowment Fund) in 1988–89, but 
this commitment to save lasted only until 1995. The government of Saskatchewan established the 
Saskatchewan Heritage Fund in 1978 to receive and invest natural resource revenues, but it was 
divested and eliminated in 1992.9 The government of Newfoundland and Labrador, a relatively 
recent recipient of significant amounts of resource revenue, has not had any public discussions of 
using resource revenues for anything other than current consumption. Given this revealed preference 
to treat resource revenue as current income, that revenue is included in the definition of the 
operating balance.10
Figure 1 plots the change in the ratio of accumulated deficits on the operating account to GDP for 
each of the four provinces since 1981–82. After adding mountains of debt during the 1980s, Alberta 
and Saskatchewan followed a similar timetable for largely (though not completely) eliminating 
that newly accumulated debt. During the 1980s Newfoundland and Labrador accumulated less 
debt on its current account (relative to GDP) than did Alberta and Saskatchewan, and beginning in 
2003–04 began to reduce its debt ratio relative to 1981–82 levels. British Columbia has more or less 
maintained a constant level of debt on its operating account relative to provincial GDP since the 
early 1990s. The purpose of the rest of this paper is to determine the sources of change in these debt 
ratios; were these changes the result of good fortune or good policy?
8 
For a history of the government of Alberta’s savings decisions, see Ronald Kneebone, “From Famine to Feast: The 
Evolution of Budgeting Rules in Alberta,” Canadian Tax Journal 54, 3 (2006).
9 On March 19, 2014 the Saskatchewan government indicated its intention to use resource revenues to fund the creation of a 
Saskatchewan Futures Fund. Deposits into the fund will begin once the government’s debt is retired, a future date that has 
been delayed by the recent fall in energy prices and resource revenues.
10 As noted in the Appendix, the natural resource revenue reported in Alberta’s public accounts is reduced by the amounts 
transferred to the AHSTF to arrive at the amount of natural resource revenue entering the operating account. No similar 
adjustment is made for the amount of resource revenue that Alberta transferred to its Sustainability Fund beginning in 
2003–04. These transfers were explicitly intended to fund operating account revenue shortfalls and not as permanent 
savings. For similar reasons, no adjustment has been made to account for what proved to be temporary deposits into the 
B.C. Endowment Fund or the Saskatchewan Heritage Fund.



































4. THE SOURCES OF DEBT ACCUMULATION
Governments are constrained in their spending choices by their access to tax revenue and by 
what they are able to borrow. This fact has the important implication that the choices available to 
governments are constrained by the economic environment in which they operate; a government 
facing high interest rates for borrowing and slow growth in its tax base is more limited in its 
spending choices than it is when interest rates are low and income is growing rapidly. A government 
that fails to adjust its spending when interest rates rise and income growth shrinks soon finds itself 
in financial trouble. Understanding these basic accounting realities is behind the approach employed 
in this study to identify what portion of provincial government debt can be identified as due to 
policy choices as opposed to economic conditions.
The following equation defines a budget constraint for a government’s operating account balance:
1 1t t t t tD D PDEF r D     
where we define
PDEFt = primary deficit (program spending less operating account revenue) in year t
11;
Dt-1 = accumulated deficit of the operating account at beginning of year t;
11 
The primary deficit can take on a negative or a positive value. If program spending is less than tax revenue, the primary 
deficit has a negative value and may be referred to as a primary surplus. Program spending includes all government 
spending except debt service, which is represented here as rtDt-1. At the provincial level of government, the largest programs 
are health, education and social services.
6Dt = accumulated deficit of the operating account at end of year t;
rt = average effective rate of interest on net debt in year t.
Some elements of the program spending and revenue in the operating account are sensitive to the 
state of the economy (the business cycle) and to movements in commodity prices. To separately 
account for these cyclical and commodity price influences it is useful to define
PDEFt = Gt – Tt – NRRt
where 
Gt = provincial government spending on goods, services and transfers to individuals and firms in 
period t;
Tt = provincial government revenues in the form of intergovernmental transfers and from taxation on 
all sources but natural resources in period t;
NRRt = provincial government revenue realized from the sale of natural resources in period t that 
enters the operating account.
We can now write
     * * * * * *1 1) (t t t t t t t t t t t t tD D G T G T NRR NRR G T NRR rD               (1)
where *tG   and 
*
tT   define values of government spending and revenue that would be observed 
were the province at full employment output. These values are commonly referred to as cyclically 
adjusted values. We refer to the difference between them, ( *tG  - 
*
tT  ), as the cyclically adjusted 
portion of the primary deficit. The difference between what is observed in the data and the cyclically 
adjusted portion is the primary deficit that is due to movements in cyclical variables that affect 
provincial revenues and spending.
Unexpected changes in the revenue that governments realize from the sale of natural resources 
is largely determined by unexpected changes in commodity prices determined in international 
markets. Thus, we assume budget-makers in these provinces make a determination of what value 
of NRRt they should expect to receive in year t based on what they forecast to be the price of 
commodity prices. NRRt* measures the revenue a budget-maker would expect to receive in period 
t given a forecast of international commodity prices and given an understanding of the impact 
of that price forecast on resource-based revenues. We refer to NRRt* as the commodity price-
adjusted portion of the primary deficit. The difference between what is observed in the data and the 
commodity price-adjusted portion is that part of resource revenues that is an unexpected gain or loss 
by the budget-maker.
The sum of the terms in square brackets identifies the amount of the deficit that can be identified as 
arising due to the provincial economy being away from full employment — what we refer to as the 
cyclical component of the primary deficit — and the amount of the deficit arising from international 
commodity prices being different from what was expected by the budget-maker — what we refer to 
as the commodity-price component of the primary deficit. 
The term in curved brackets in Equation (1) defines the size of the primary deficit that the budget-
maker would expect to observe given his or her understanding of the commodity prices affecting 
resource revenues and assuming the provincial economy were operating at full employment. A 
7non-zero value of this term would reflect a set of policy choices in the form of tax and royalty rates 
and spending choices that produce a non-zero primary deficit. This will be referred to as the policy 
component of the primary deficit.
Of interest is the identification of sources of change in the ratio of the accumulated deficit to GDP; 
referred to more simply as the debt ratio. It makes sense to compare debt to GDP as the latter defines 
the collective income of the province’s citizens and so measures the capacity for managing debt. The 










where Y is GDP. Using Equation (1) and noting that values of Yt and Yt-1 are related by the rate of 
growth in GDP in the following way:




n = the rate of growth in Y,
n* = the rate of growth in potential output, Y*,
the change in the debt ratio can be written as
   1
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Policy Component =
 ** * * 1t t tt t t
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The definition of the cyclical component identifies the change in the ratio of debt to GDP resulting 
from an economic slowdown as being measured not only by the resulting change in the size of 
income-sensitive components of the primary deficit — changes that cause a gap between G and G* 
and between T and T* — but also influences GDP itself, and so causes a gap between the observed 
rate of growth in GDP, n, and the rate of growth in potential output, n*.12
12 It is worth emphasizing that no attempt is made to identify how the interest rate might vary with the business cycle. This 
reflects an assumption that the interest rate does not react automatically to, or in a predictable way with, the business cycle.
8Accusing a government of fiscal irresponsibility when its debt ratio is made large by the effects 
of recession or when commodity prices are lower than might be reasonably expected is not a fair 
assessment of the budgetary consequences of a government’s policy choices. The same comment 
is appropriate when the debt ratio is made small by the effects of a cyclical boom or an unexpected 
increase in commodity prices. Removing these influences — which leaves us with the policy 
component — is appropriate if the goal is to identify how much blame for government debt can be 
laid at the feet of policy-makers. To put it differently, identifying the amount of debt accumulated 
after removing the effects of the provincial economic cycle and international commodity price 
movements indicates to what extent a government over- or under-taxes its citizens relative to the 
level of public services provided.13
The measure of the policy component is motivated by the idea that fiscal policy choices are 
constrained by the level of debt inherited from previous governments, by the economic conditions 
determining the interest rate paid on outstanding debt, the rate of growth in the tax base and the 
levels of cyclically sensitive spending and revenues and, finally, by unexpected movements in 
commodity prices. Depending on economic circumstances — particularly those determining the 
relative values of the interest rate due on outstanding debt and the rate of growth in potential output 
— the same set of fiscal policy choices may or may not be labelled fiscally irresponsible. 
To better appreciate this point, it is easy to see from the definitions of the cyclical, commodity price, 
and policy components of the change in the debt ratio, that if the levels and growth rates of actual 
and potential output are equal and if commodity prices are at levels expected by the budget-maker, 
then there is no tendency for the debt-to-output ratio to rise only if
    * * * * 1( )t t t t t tG T NRR n r D      .    (3)
The term on the right-hand side is the target for a fiscally responsible set of fiscal policy choices. The 
debt-to-output ratio will tend to increase as a consequence of fiscal policy choices when the balance 
between spending and all sources of revenue is above the target, and tend to decrease when below 
the target.
As noted by Ron Kneebone and John Leach,14 implicit in this argument is the idea that governments 
with outstanding debt cannot spend as if they were not responsible for paying the interest on the 
outstanding debt they have inherited. Their cyclically- and commodity-price-adjusted deficits can be 
positive when the interest rate is low and the rate of growth in potential output is high (r < n*), but 
they should be negative when the interest rate is high and the rate of growth in potential output is 
low (r > n*). Policy settings appropriate when interest rates are low relative to growth rates in full-
employment output may not be appropriate in an economic environment when the opposite is true.
In what follows, the definitions of the cyclical, commodity price and policy components are applied 
to the data defining the government’s operating account. The so-called “golden rule” of public 
finances is that operating accounts ought to be such that, in the normal course of events, they 
13 
Cyclical and commodity-price components are not wholly “policy free.” Their magnitudes are affected by the extent to 
which governments make their revenues and spending obligations sensitive to changes in income, the extent to which they 
make resource revenues sensitive to commodity price movements, and by their decision over what fraction of resource 
revenue ought to be considered equivalent to current income. The cyclical component therefore shows the change in the debt 
ratio due to the business cycle impacting the government budget via the current set of tax rates and the current design of 
spending programs and so shows the operation of automatic stabilizers, the size of which is a matter of policy.
14 
Ronald Kneebone and John Leach, “The Accumulation of Public Debt in Canada,” Canadian Public Policy 27, 3 
(September 2001).
9balance spending with revenues. More precisely, the application of the golden rule is that, at full 
employment, the operating account should not be causing the debt ratio to increase. Applying the 
golden rule of public finance would require that our definition of the policy component be zero at 
full employment and that, over time, when economic downturns have been balanced by economic 
booms, the accumulated deficits of the government’s operating account should be zero.
5. POTENTIAL OUTPUT, THE CYCLICALLY ADJUSTED PRIMARY DEFICIT  
 AND COMMODITY PRICE FORECASTS
The accounting framework requires that one identify cyclically adjusted provincial revenue and 
spending and use these values to define the cyclically adjusted primary deficit. This in turn requires 
estimates of potential output, Y*, and its rate of growth, n*. We also require an estimate of what a 
reasonable budget-maker might expect to receive by way of natural resource revenues, NRR*.
Full Employment Output
It is common practice to generate values of provincial potential GDP (Y*) by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter to observed values of GDP (Y). The HP filter is intended to decompose data on 
GDP into trend and cycle components.15 The attraction of the HP filter is that its application involves 
a minimum of judgment and requires a minimum of data. What’s more, the resulting smooth but 
non-linear time series of potential output accords with most analysts’ expectations of the evolution 
of that series.16,17
15 
The HP filter is applied to measures of provincial real GDP. Multiplying these measures by the GDP implicit price deflator 
yields an estimate of Y* measured in nominal dollars. Data on provincial real and nominal GDP are from CANSIM Table 
3840038. These data are calendar-year measures that span the period 1981–2012, inclusive. Since the data on provincial 
finances are measured on a fiscal-year basis (April 1 to March 31) a fiscal-year version of Y and Y* is calculated using the 
formula FYt = 0.25CYt + 0.75CYt-1.
16 
The HP filter suffers from what is known as the end-point problem: the fact that the approach causes estimates of potential 
output at the beginning and at the end of the time series to be close to observed values of output. To deal with this issue, 
we follow an approach that involves extending the data series on output beyond the end, and prior to the beginning, of the 
study’s sample period. Marianne Baxter and Robert King (“Measuring Business Cycles: Approximate Band-Pass Filters 
for Economic Time Series,” Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (1999)) recommend adding at least three years of data 
(when using annual data) to each end of the sample period. That advice is followed here. Three years of data on provincial 
nominal output prior to 1981 (for years 1978–1980, inclusive) are taken from CANSIM series v123650 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador), v123734 (Saskatchewan), v123746 (Alberta) and v508458 (British Columbia). In lieu of an implicit price deflator, 
we rely on provincial measures of the consumer price index from CANSIM series D44978 (Newfoundland and Labrador), 
D45125 (Saskatchewan), D45146 (Alberta) and D45167 (British Columbia) for those years. Forecasts of real and nominal 
provincial output for three years beyond the end of our sample (2014–2016) are taken from TD Economics, Provincial 
Economic Forecast Update (January 26, 2015).
17 
An alternative approach to using the HP filter is to estimate an aggregate production function relating output to the inputs 
producing that output. The modelling requirements of this approach are significant as are the data requirements, with the 
latter issue particularly acute at the sub-national level. Using Canadian provincial data, Yvan Guillemette (“A Simulation 
Model of Federal, Provincial, and Territorial Government Accounts for the Analysis of Fiscal-Consolidation Strategies 
in Canada,” OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 800 (August 2010)) shows that the production-function 
approach yields similar estimates of provincial potential output to those produced by the HP filter.
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Cyclically Adjusted Balances
To arrive at estimates of the cyclically adjusted primary deficit, we employ an approach utilized by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the OECD and other research organizations.18 Cyclically 
sensitive components of the provincial budget are adjusted proportionately to the ratio of potential 
output to observed output, as determined by its elasticity with respect to the output gap. Thus,




i t i t t tT T Y Y

    0i   




j t j t t tG G Y Y

    0j   ,
where Ti,t = observed revenue from revenue type i in year t, Gj,t = observed expenditure on program 
j in year t, starred variables are values that would be observed at potential output, and i  ,   j are 
elasticities measuring the sensitivity to output of revenue category i and program expenditure j, 
respectively. Once values of *,i tT   and 
*
,i tG  are calculated, the remaining (non-adjusted) categories are 
added in order to derive structural total revenues and expenditures.
The IMF suggests an elasticity value of 0.7 for personal income tax revenue, 1.5 for corporate 
income tax revenue, 1.0 for indirect tax revenue, 1.0 for other tax revenue, and -0.1 for program 
expenditures.19 With one exception, those are the elasticity values used here. The exception is the 
elasticity value for personal income tax revenue in Saskatchewan, which we set at a value of 1.4. 
This is based on work by Guillemette,20 who provides province-specific elasticity measures and 
notes that personal income tax revenues in Saskatchewan are considerably more sensitive to income 
than in other provinces.
Applying data to Equation (2) also requires a value of the interest rate, rt, observed in each year 
for each government. For this purpose, an effective rate of interest paid by these governments is 
calculated as the amount paid in debt charges in year t divided by the amount of net debt inherited 
from year t-1.
Expected Values of Natural Resource Revenues
We assume budget-makers in these provinces make a determination of what value of natural 
resource revenues they should expect to receive in a particular year ( *tNRR  ) based on a forecast of 
international commodity prices and given an understanding of the impact of that price forecast 
18 
See, for example, Fabian Bornhorst et al., “When and How to Adjust Beyond the Business Cycle: A Guide to Structural 
Balances,” IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, Technical Notes and Manuals (April 2011); Nathalie Girouard and Christophe 
Andre, “Measuring Cyclically-adjusted Budget Balances for OECD Countries,” OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper No. 434 (2005); and Martin Larch and Alessandro Turrini, “The Cyclically-adjusted Budget Balance in EU Fiscal 
Policy Making: A Love at First Sight Turned into a Mature Relationship,” Economic Papers 374 (European Commission, 
March 2009).
19 As reported in Bornhorst et al. (“When and How”), results are not terribly sensitive to alternative choices of these elasticity 
values. The values used are those suggested for Canada in the template accompanying that paper (http://www.imf.org/
external/np/fad/strfiscbal/index.htm). 
20 
Guillemette, “A Simulation Model.”
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on resource-based revenues. For this purpose, we assume they follow a simple approach of using 
as their forecast a three-year moving average of previously observed values of natural resource 
revenues.21
6. SOURCES OF DEBT ACCUMULATION
In this section, data describing the operating accounts of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan 
and Newfoundland and Labrador are applied to the accounting framework described by Equation 
(2). It is shown how this framework can be used to determine to what extent the fiscal policy choices 
of these governments can be held responsible for the accumulation of debt.
Alberta
Figure 2 shows the annual change in the ratio of accumulated deficits to GDP (the debt ratio) due 
to the influence of the business cycle (the cyclical component), international commodity price 
































































































































































Total Change in Accumulated Deficit Ratio
21 
The length of the moving average reflects the level of tolerance the budget-maker has for volatility in the amount of revenue 
assumed for planning purposes. Were a government to choose to budget using a five-year moving average, this would 
imply it has less tolerance for volatility in the revenue assumed for planning purposes than if it were to choose a three-year 
moving average. Our results are not terribly sensitive to this assumption.
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Each of the coloured bars identifies the change in the ratio of the accumulated deficit to GDP (the 
“debt ratio”), measured in percentage points of GDP, due to elements identified in Equation (2). Bars 
above the zero line indicate the influence is such to cause the debt ratio to increase; bars below the 
line indicate the influence is in the direction of reducing the debt ratio. The blue line identifies the 
vertical sum of the bars for any year and so measures the total observed change in the debt ratio 
for that year. For example, in 1993–94, one bar defines an influence pushing the debt ratio upward, 
while the other two bars define influences pulling the debt ratio downward. The latter two bars are 
of nearly equal size to the former, indicating that, as shown by the blue line, there was no overall 
change in the debt ratio in that year. Over the period 1982–83 to 2013–14, the ratio of accumulated 
deficits to GDP decreased by 8.6 percentage points of GDP.
The yellow bars identify the cyclical component. The cyclical component exhibits a wavy pattern of 
positive contributions to the debt ratio during periods of recession in the early 1980s, the early 1990s 
and with the most recent recession. Periods of strong economic growth — the mid-1980s and from 
the mid-1990s to mid-2000s — saw the debt ratio fall as cyclically sensitive revenues increased and 
cyclically sensitive expenditures fell. Over the period 1982–83 to 2013–14, the business cycle was 
responsible for increasing Alberta’s debt ratio by 1.0 percentage point of provincial GDP. The largest 
contributions to increasing the debt ratio came during the recession of the early 1990s.22
A more important explanation for movements in Alberta’s debt ratio is due to the commodity-price 
component shown by the grey bars in Figure 1. Periods of unexpectedly low resource prices were 
responsible for significant increases in the debt ratio during the late 1980s, particularly following 
a sudden fall in oil prices in 1986. Unexpectedly high prices during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
were responsible for significant reductions in the debt ratio. Over the entire period from 1982–83 
to 2013–14, the commodity-price cycle was responsible for decreasing Alberta’s debt ratio by 1.9 
percentage points of GDP.
The black bars identify the change in the debt ratio due to the policy component. The policy 
component shows the effect on the debt ratio of discretionary changes in revenues and spending and 
changes in the government’s expectation about commodity prices. A positive value for the policy 
component indicates that, given the economic environment, provincial fiscal policy choices will 
result in the accumulation of debt even when at full employment levels and growth rates of output, 
and commodity prices are at expected levels. As the discussion in the previous section suggests, 
such a value for the policy component reflects a failure of government to respond to trends in its 
economic environment in a way that guarantees fiscal sustainability over the long term.
Over the entire period from 1982–83 to 2013–14, the policy component was responsible for 
increasing Alberta’s debt ratio by 9.5 percentage points of provincial GDP. The largest contribution 
in this regard came during the period 1982–83 to 1992–93 when the government accumulated an 
amount of debt on its operating account equal to 23 percentage points of provincial GDP. This was 
22 
The cyclical component is influenced by two considerations: by the deviation of output, Y, from potential output, Y* (which 
causes the observed primary deficit, G – T, to deviate from its value at potential output, G* – T*), and by the deviation of 
the observed growth rate of output, n, from the growth rate of potential output, n*. Calculating that portion of the cyclical 
component due only to n being different from n* provides an estimate of what would have happened to the debt ratio had 
governments continually adjusted tax rates and continually adjusted spending programs to always keep (G – T) = (G* – T*). 
In other words, one would be showing the result of governments intentionally short-circuiting automatic stabilizers. This 
exercise shows that, in Alberta, had governments behaved in this fashion over the entire period of our sample, the debt ratio 
would have increased by 6.5 percentage points of GDP rather than 8.6 percentage points. The implication is that automatic 
stabilizers, over the 32 years of our sample, added 2.1 percentage points of GDP to the debt ratio.
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followed by the period from 1993–94 to 2006–07 when the governments of then premier Ralph 
Klein reduced the debt ratio by a total of 16 percentage points of GDP.23, 24
Saskatchewan
Figure 3 presents the same information as Figure 2, but does so using data describing the finances 
of the government of Saskatchewan. The same vertical scale on the two figures is used to enable 
an easier comparison of the results for the two provinces. Over the entire period from 1982–83 to 
2013–14, the debt ratio in Saskatchewan increased by 7.0 percentage points of provincial GDP.
Cyclical influences have been generally larger in Saskatchewan than in Alberta, possibly due to 
the former being a less economically diversified economy. Over the period 1982–83 to 2013–14, 
the business cycle was responsible for adding 1.5 percentage points of GDP to Saskatchewan’s debt 
ratio.25
23 
Observing a positive (negative) value for the policy component in a year of economic contraction (expansion) might be 
interpreted as indicative of a discretionary counter-cyclical policy. This was observed in Alberta during half the years of 
our sample. One might judge these observations as a sign of a desirable policy intervention. That interpretation requires 
believing that discretionary provincial fiscal policies — particularly those stemming from changes in the government’s 
operating account — have a favourable influence on output and/or the Bank of Canada’s interest rate policies. If a provincial 
government recognizes that its fiscal policies can have no significant effect on output or market interest rates, then the 
effects of a positive policy component is negligible in the short term and, to the extent it results in an increase in the risk 
premium on its debt, negative in the long term. A provincial government wishing to stimulate a contracting economy is 
generally advised to rely on its capital budget for this purpose; the idea being that investments in public infrastructure 
that are complementary to private production will have maximum stimulative and long-term benefits on the economy. 
This advice has the added benefit of steering governments away from using their operating account — where spending is 
dominated by health care, education and social services — to fund temporary expansions and contractions in their budgets.
24 As noted earlier, although treating resource revenues as current income is the practice of provincial governments, most 
economists emphasize that all, or at least some fraction of these revenues ought to be part of a capital budget and so 
removed from the operating account. If that advice were followed and some fraction of resource revenues removed from 
the operating account, this adjustment would change the size of the annual deficit in the operating account, the size of the 
accumulated deficit, D, and values of NRR and NRR*. As a consequence, all three components of the change in the ratio 
of accumulated deficit to GDP are affected. If 30 per cent of resource revenues were removed from Alberta’s operating 
account, the accumulated deficits of the operating account would have been equal to 47 percentage points of GDP since 
1982–83 and policy choices would account for nearly all of that increase.
25 As explained in footnote 24, reporting only that portion of the cyclical component resulting from n being different from n*, 
one determines what role automatic stabilizers played in debt accumulation. The calculation for Saskatchewan suggests that, 
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The commodity-price cycle that is relevant for Saskatchewan includes the price of potash and so 
is somewhat different than the prices (mainly oil and gas) that are relevant for Alberta. The broad 
pattern over our sample period, however, is quite similar. Unexpectedly low natural resource prices 
in the late 1980s added to the provincial debt while unexpectedly higher prices during the late 
2000s had the opposite effect. Over the period 1982–83 to 2013–14, the commodity-price cycle was 
responsible for decreasing Saskatchewan’s debt ratio by 6.1 percentage points of provincial GDP.
Over the period 1982–83 to 2013–14, the policy component was responsible for increasing 
Saskatchewan’s debt ratio by 11.6 percentage points of provincial GDP. As in Alberta, this was the 
net result of a period of policy-induced debt accumulation during the 1980s and early 1990s followed 
by policy-induced debt reductions more or less since then. Much of Saskatchewan’s fiscal policy 
since the early 1990s can be fairly assessed as an effort to undo the effects on the provincial debt 
and credit rating of the previous lost decade of policy-induced debt accumulation.
An interesting interpretation of the pattern exhibited by the policy component is one associated with 
politics. For this purpose, party affiliations of the government in power are identified in Figure 3. 
Summing the increases in the debt ratio caused by the policy choices of the government in power 
allows one to identify what some might suggest is the proclivity of certain political parties to add 
or subtract government debt. The results of this exercise, reported below, turns on its head the 
usual stereotype of governments on the right of the political spectrum maintaining more fiscally 
conservative policies while those on the left choose to maintain a “looser” set of fiscal policies. 
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The contrast between the implications for the debt ratio of policies adopted by the Progressive 
Conservative and the New Democrats is startling.26
POLITICAL BOX SCORE: SASKATCHEWAN
Governing Party Progressive Conservative Party (PC)
New Democratic Party 
(NDP)
Saskatchewan Party  
(SK)
Years as government 10 16 6
Total debt accumulated as a result of policy choices  
(percentage points of GDP) +23.8 -9.7 -2.5
Annual average amount of debt accumulated as a result of policy 
choices (percentage points of GDP) +2.4 -0.6 -0.4
Comparing Alberta and Saskatchewan, one observes a broadly similar pattern whereby policy 
choices lead to a rapid accumulation of debt during the 1980s and early 1990s. The latter half of the 
1990s and the 2000s were periods of policy-induced retrenchments. More recently, the provinces 
have moved in opposite directions with Alberta returning to policy-induced debt accumulation while 
Saskatchewan has, for the most part, continued to introduce policies that have had a minimal impact 
on its operating account deficit.
Newfoundland and Labrador
Figure 4 identifies for the government of Newfoundland and Labrador the contributions to the ratio 
of accumulated deficits to provincial GDP of the business cycle, the commodity-price cycle and 
government policy choices. Over the period 1982–83 to 2013–14, the operating account debt ratio in 
Newfoundland and Labrador decreased by over 25 percentage points of provincial GDP. 
Cyclical influences have generally been much larger in Newfoundland and Labrador than in either 
Saskatchewan or Alberta (or, as we’ll see, in British Columbia). The obvious explanation is that of 
the four provinces being considered, Newfoundland and Labrador is easily the least diversified and 
so the government budget is the most exposed to swings in business activity. However, over the 
period 1982–83 to 2013–14, the booms and busts of the business cycle have been largely offsetting 
so that it has been responsible for adding only 4.0 percentage points of GDP to Newfoundland and 
Labrador’s debt ratio.27 
26 
Assuming the provincial government saved 30 per cent of resource revenues and so allowed only 70 per cent to be treated 
as current income produces an even bleaker picture of the fiscal policy choices of Progressive Conservative governments. 
With that assumption, the policy choices of PC governments were responsible for 34 percentage points of debt during their 
10 years in power. During their years in power, the NDP and the Saskatchewan Party would now be identified has having 
reduced debt by 1.8 and 4.3 percentage points of GDP, respectively.
27 Reporting only that portion of the cyclical component resulting from n being different from n*, one determines what role 
automatic stabilizers played in debt accumulation. The calculation for Newfoundland and Labrador suggests that over the 32 
years of the sample period, automatic stabilizers increased the debt ratio by 3.2 percentage points of provincial GDP.
16
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The commodity-price cycle that is relevant for Newfoundland and Labrador is almost exclusively 
due to the price of offshore oil. Most important for the commodity-price component of the increase 
in the accumulated deficit is, however, the very emergence of the offshore oil industry beginning in 
the early 1990s and the beginning of significant inflows of oil royalties beginning in the early 2000s. 
Since 1982–83, the commodity-price component has been responsible for reducing the operating 
account debt ratio by 16.9 percentage points of GDP. 
Over the period 1982–83 to 2013–14, the policy component was responsible for decreasing 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s debt ratio by 9.8 percentage points of provincial GDP. The province 
is remarkable in the size of swings in debt-induced policy choices; notably, the 17-percentage-point 
reduction in the debt ratio in the mid-1990s and the eight-percentage-point increase in the early 
2000s. 
The rapid reduction in the debt ratio in Newfoundland and Labrador since 2004–05 — a reduction 
equal to 27 percentage points of GDP — has been partly due to policy choices (contributing to 
a reduction of 11 percentage points of GDP) and partly due to a favourable commodity-price 
component (contributing to a reduction in debt equal to 15 percentage points of GDP). 
17
POLITICAL BOX SCORE: NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR
Governing Party Progressive Conservative Party Liberal Party
Years as government 17 15
Total debt accumulated as a result of policy choices  
(percentage points of GDP) -5.5 -4.3
Annual average amount of debt accumulated as a result of policy 
choices (percentage points of GDP) -0.3 -0.3
The political box score suggests that, in Newfoundland and Labrador, the Liberal and Progressive 
Conservative parties have introduced very similar policies as regards their impact on the operating 
account deficit. As Figure 5 shows, Progressive Conservative and Liberal governments have both 
governed during periods when they have dramatically increased debt with their policy choices, as 
well as periods where the government has dramatically decreased debt. Thus, while each party has 
a similar record on debt reduction during their mandates, both have also introduced a good deal of 
volatility in the debt ratio with their policy choices. 
British Columbia
Figure 5 identifies for British Columbia the contributions to the ratio of accumulated deficits to 
provincial GDP of the business cycle, the commodity-price cycle and government policy choices. 
Over the period 1982–83 to 2013–14, the debt ratio in British Columbia increased by 9.7 percentage 
points of provincial GDP.
An obvious feature of the calculations for B.C. is that the three components of debt are all much 
smaller than in the other three provinces being considered here. The cyclical component was 
responsible for an increase in the debt ratio of 2.0 percentage points of GDP, while the commodity-
price component explains a reduction of 4.9 percentage points. The policy component was the 
largest contributor to debt; over the sample period, provincial fiscal policy choices caused the debt 
ratio to decrease by 12.5 percentage points of GDP.28 
28 
Automatic stabilizers are calculated to have added 2.5 percentage points of provincial GDP to B.C.’s accumulated deficit 
ratio since 1982–83.
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Although B.C. is somewhat infamous for its polarizing provincial politics, its political box score 
suggests that, at least when it comes to the effect of their fiscal policy choices on debt, there is very 
little difference between the three parties.
POLITICAL BOX SCORE: BRITISH COLUMBIA
Governing Party Social Credit Party Liberal Party New Democratic Party
Years as government 9 13 10
Total debt accumulated as a result of policy choices  
(percentage points of GDP) +6.2 +1.2 +5.2
Annual average amount of debt accumulated as a result of policy 
choices (percentage points of GDP) +0.7 +0.1 +0.5
7. DISCUSSION
As Figure 1 illustrates, from 1981–82 to 1992–93 the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan 
accumulated deficits on their operating accounts that added over 30 percentage points of GDP to 
their debt loads. Much of this accumulation of debt was the consequence of policy choices. In both 
provinces, policy choices made worse a problem also caused by unfavourable commodity prices 
shocks. After 1992–93, both provinces managed to eliminate most of this newly accumulated debt. 
Interestingly, since 1992–93 the sources of debt reduction have been almost identical: policy changes 
reduced the debt ratio by 13 percentage points while favourable commodity price shocks reduced 
debt by 10 percentage points. Saskatchewan benefited from a more favourable cyclical influence 
19
than did Alberta over this period. In neither province did the business cycle result in a reduction in 
debt greater than an amount equal to one percentage point of provincial GDP 
It is noteworthy that in Saskatchewan, the accumulation of debt was due almost wholly to the 
policy choices of Progressive Conservative governments during the 1980s, while the reduction 
of that debt occurred under the watch of NDP governments and was more or less consistently 
supported by policy choices. The current government, led by the Saskatchewan Party, has had to 
deal with negative commodity price shocks that the previous government rarely had to deal with. 
It has responded with policy choices that had offset these shocks and so maintained a more or less 
constant debt ratio. In Alberta, although all governments were Progressive Conservative, noticeable 
differences appear depending on leadership. Thus former premier Klein (1992-2006) introduced 
policy changes that had much different implications for the operating account debt than the policy 
choices of his predecessor, Don Getty (1985–1992). The election of Alison Redford as premier in 
2011 saw the return of a series of policy-induced debt increases rarely seen in the province since the 
early 1990s.
In the mid 1990s, the government of Newfoundland and Labrador responded very aggressively to 
the accumulation of operating account debt with policy changes that, despite a downturn in the 
economy, contributed to reducing the debt ratio by 10 percentage points of GDP. In the mid-2000s 
the debt ratio fell by nearly 25 percentage points of GDP thanks to favourable commodity-price 
shocks but also a concerted effort to reduce debt with policy changes. As the political box score for 
the province indicates, there seems to be little difference between political parties when it comes to 
policy-induced debt changes. 
Figure 1 highlights how the experience in British Columbia with respect to debt accumulation stands 
in contrast to the other three provinces. Outside of small declines in the debt ratio in the late 1980s 
under then Social Credit premier Bill Vander Zalm and during the mid-2000s under then Liberal 
premier Gordon Campbell, the operating account debt ratio has remained more or less constant 
relative to its level in 1981–82. In part, this is due to B.C. having a more diversified economic base 
than the other provinces. But it is also because, as shown in Figure 5, policy initiatives have been 
fairly small in their impact on debt, something that has been true regardless of the political party in 
power. 
8. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of how policy choices, unexpected 
commodity price shocks and movements in the business cycle have each influenced the amount of 
debt accumulated in the four Canadian provinces most dependent upon the revenues earned on the 
sale of natural resources. An understanding of what drives the accumulation of government debt 
requires a time series describing government finances that is internally consistent insofar as the 
effect of spending and revenue choices on debt can be clearly identified. An important contribution 
of this paper was to construct a database of provincial government finances that allows this to be 
done. Those data are provided in the Appendix. 
The second contribution of this study was to define an accounting framework that allows one to 
identify how much government debt has been accumulated as a consequence of policy choices 
as opposed to the effects of the business cycle and the effects of unexpected commodity price 
movements. This framework emphasizes that governments should be held accountable for paying 
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the interest on the debts they have inherited from previous governments and that to be labelled 
fiscally responsible requires that governments respond to changes in the economic environment. 
The final contribution made by this paper was to show how this framework can be used to look 
backwards to evaluate the extent to which policy choices have contributed to changes in the debt 
ratio. Those calculations show that, while over certain periods the business cycle has played a role 
in debt accumulation, over the 30-plus years described by the data, the effects of economic booms 
and busts have been largely offsetting in their influence on government debt in the four resource 
dependent provinces. Virtually all of the debt incurred by these governments has therefore been the 
result of policy choices and what we identify as unexpected movements in commodity prices.
The data available for this study end with the 2013–14 fiscal year. The fiscal year that is about to end 
— 2014–15 — has been a momentous one for provinces reliant on resource revenues. The price of 
oil began to fall in the summer of 2014 and by the end of the calendar year had declined by 50 per 
cent. The economies of Newfoundland and Labrador, Alberta and Saskatchewan — in that order 
— are expected by forecasters to suffer the most from this change in commodity prices.29 When 
2014–15 data become available, an application of our analysis will identify a large commodity price 
and cyclical component, each contributing to a noticeable increase in provincial debt ratios. The 
size and direction of the policy component will be determined by provincial budgets to be released 
in the spring of 2015. “Belt-tightening” is the usual refrain from governments during times like 
these, suggesting a policy component in the direction of reducing the debt ratio. It is unlikely the 
debt-reducing policy response will — or even should — completely offset the increase in the debt 
ratio stemming from the fall in commodity prices and the downturn in the economic cycle. The 
governments of these four provinces, then, are likely in line for a new bout of debt accumulation 
on their operating accounts. As a consequence, taxpayers will once again be faced with the choice 
of whether to realign current spending and taxes to accommodate lower resource revenues or to 
maintain the status quo and hope for a recovery of those revenues.
***
29 
See, for example, TD Economics, Provincial Economic Forecast Update, January 26, 2015.
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APPENDIX
The following four tables present the provincial budget data used in this study. These data comes 
from the public accounts of the four provinces and are measured in millions of nominal dollars.
As explained in the text, what we record as the accumulated deficit is the sum of annual deficits in 
the operating account since 1979–80. The accumulated deficit differs from measures of net debt as 
the latter includes the accumulated deficits from government funds other than the operating account.
Our analysis requires an initial value for the accumulated deficit. For this purpose we use the net 
debt for each province in 1979–80 as reported in the Fiscal Reference Tables (FRT) published by the 
federal Department of Finance, October 2002. Our calculations of the cycle, commodity and policy 
components rely on changes in the operating account debt ratio and so are not critically dependent 
on this initial value.
Similar data to ours are contained in the Fiscal Reference Tables (FRT) published by the federal 
Department of Finance. However, the data in the following tables go beyond what is found in the 
FRT by reporting not only total spending and total revenue but also revenues and expenditures by 
major categories. 
Where our data and the FRT report data on the same categories, the two sets of data closely match 
what is reported for Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador. As noted in the text, 
however, the data presented here remove from Alberta’s resource revenues the amounts transferred 
to the AHSTF. These transfers occurred from 1980–81 to 1986–87 and from 2005–06 to 2007–08, 
inclusive. Recognizing these transfers means that data on Alberta’s total revenue are also adjusted. 
An important difference between our data and that reported for Newfoundland and Labrador in the 
FRT is that the latter include the net income of government business enterprises when calculating 
the annual deficit, while we do not.
The data we report for British Columbia differ more noticeably from what is reported in the FRT. 
Our data represent the province’s main operating account, known as the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund, and exclude the net balances of Crown corporations and agencies, the SUCH (schools, 
universities, colleges and health authorities) sector and other adjustments, such as the HST 
repayment to the federal government. Notes to the FRT for British Columbia indicate these budget 



















































1980-81 941 588 0 740 3,211 1,997 7,477 1,577 506 1,398 4,015 7,496 22 7,518 41 -8,463
1981-82 1,323 581 0 1,145 3,314 3,074 9,437 1,875 703 1,969 4,100 8,647 91 8,738 -699 -9,162
1982-83 1,650 609 0 1,167 2,752 3,415 9,593 2,438 918 2,473 5,875 11,704 55 11,759 2,166 -6,996
1983-84 1,510 782 0 1,308 4,059 3,574 11,233 2,724 985 2,627 5,317 11,653 171 11,824 591 -6,405
1984-85 1,457 828 0 1,686 4,493 4,083 12,547 2,731 1,051 2,783 5,245 11,810 228 12,038 -509 -6,914
1985-86 1,521 780 0 1,788 4,247 4,273 12,609 3,003 1,156 2,961 6,753 13,873 182 14,055 1,446 -5,468
1986-87 1,768 396 0 1,689 1,675 3,872 9,400 3,244 1,270 3,114 5,725 13,353 297 13,650 4,250 -1,218
1987-88 2,236 595 0 1,912 2,626 4,536 11,905 3,114 1,329 3,118 5,137 12,698 572 13,270 1,365 147
1988-89 2,039 697 0 2,135 2,085 4,944 11,900 3,372 1,434 3,227 5,077 13,110 797 13,907 2,007 2,154
1989-90 2,536 700 0 1,943 2,240 5,420 12,839 3,631 1,502 3,379 5,328 13,840 1,115 14,955 2,116 4,270
1990-91 2,796 803 0 2,365 2,688 5,533 14,185 3,895 1,567 3,532 5,741 14,735 1,282 16,017 1,832 6,102
1991-92 3,057 731 0 2,150 2,022 5,777 13,737 4,129 1,746 3,676 5,501 15,052 1,314 16,366 2,629 8,731
1992-93 2,794 637 0 2,457 2,183 6,200 14,271 4,352 1,889 3,904 6,031 16,176 1,419 17,595 3,324 12,055
1993-94 2,877 854 0 2,090 2,817 6,768 15,406 4,194 1,721 4,036 5,172 15,123 1,654 16,777 1,371 13,426
1994-95 3,063 1,073 0 1,929 3,378 6,721 16,164 3,928 1,495 3,756 4,301 13,480 1,746 15,226 -938 12,488
1995-96 3,177 1,332 0 1,748 2,786 6,472 15,515 3,773 1,456 3,713 3,739 12,681 1,683 14,364 -1,151 11,337
1996-97 3,445 1,407 0 1,351 4,034 6,415 16,652 4,006 1,511 3,738 3,446 12,701 1,462 14,163 -2,489 8,848
1997-98 3,877 1,849 0 1,183 3,778 7,067 17,754 4,401 1,564 4,081 3,727 13,773 1,322 15,095 -2,659 6,189
1998-99 4,601 1,659 0 1,335 2,368 6,856 16,819 4,660 1,560 4,241 3,885 14,346 1,379 15,725 -1,094 5,095
1999-00 5,100 1,255 0 1,640 4,650 7,458 20,103 5,341 1,668 4,735 4,612 16,356 956 17,312 -2,791 2,304
2000-01 3,943 2,023 0 1,813 10,586 7,162 25,527 5,946 1,790 5,040 5,200 17,976 980 18,956 -6,571 -4,267
2001-02 4,183 2,229 0 2,264 6,227 7,023 21,926 6,846 1,942 6,099 5,184 20,071 774 20,845 -1,081 -5,348
2002-03 4,834 2,019 0 2,074 7,130 6,605 22,662 6,917 2,108 5,461 5,567 20,053 476 20,529 -2,133 -7,481
2003-04 4,613 1,696 0 2,926 7,676 8,976 25,887 7,646 2,272 5,854 5,708 21,480 271 21,751 -4,136 -11,617
2004-05 4,649 2,364 0 3,219 9,744 9,352 29,328 9,059 2,438 6,370 5,984 23,851 302 24,153 -5,175 -16,792
2005-06 4,677 2,917 0 3,392 12,597 10,209 33,792 9,709 2,707 6,900 7,427 26,743 248 26,991 -6,801 -23,593
2006-07 7,622 3,606 0 3,077 11,010 11,452 36,767 10,880 2,879 7,817 7,716 29,292 215 29,507 -7,260 -30,853
2007-08 8,271 4,695 0 3,048 10,106 11,131 37,251 12,286 3,117 8,886 9,085 33,374 214 33,588 -3,663 -34,516
2008-09 8,708 4,252 0 4,185 11,915 6,751 35,811 13,107 3,418 9,411 10,519 36,455 208 36,663 852 -33,664
2009-10 7,877 4,754 0 4,941 6,768 11,318 35,658 13,180 3,807 9,538 9,802 36,327 363 36,690 1,032 -32,632
2010-11 7,631 3,334 0 5,025 8,428 10,616 35,034 15,034 4,130 9,276 9,532 37,972 472 38,444 3,410 -29,222
2011-12 8,563 3,678 0 4,777 11,636 10,889 39,543 15,562 4,278 9,271 9,956 39,067 499 39,566 23 -29,199
2012-13 9,621 4,756 0 4,804 7,779 11,796 38,756 16,529 4,641 9,311 10,605 41,086 512 41,598 2,842 -26,357



















































1980-81 1,369 457 758 1,077 862 1,177 5,700 1,672 831 1,318 2,219 6,040 19 6,059 360 -1,440
1981-82 1,848 580 1,130 1,082 598 1,535 6,774 1,949 818 1,550 2,753 7,071 17 7,087 314 -1,127
1982-83 2,008 189 999 1,216 541 2,375 7,328 2,232 1,194 1,669 2,390 7,485 28 7,513 186 -941
1983-84 1,819 309 1,201 1,773 677 1,463 7,242 2,486 1,404 1,751 2,611 8,251 113 8,364 1,121 180
1984-85 1,853 366 1,332 1,825 721 2,710 8,807 2,963 1,266 2,379 2,763 9,371 430 9,801 994 1,174
1985-86 2,073 324 1,452 1,856 704 2,752 9,160 3,084 1,298 2,328 2,941 9,651 476 10,127 967 2,141
1986-87 2,248 281 1,551 2,025 658 2,701 9,463 3,368 1,298 2,353 2,957 9,976 648 10,624 1,161 3,302
1987-88 2,790 473 1,463 2,054 1,223 3,004 11,007 3,603 1,349 2,501 2,792 10,245 810 11,055 48 3,350
1988-89 2,995 600 1,718 2,149 1,271 3,836 12,570 3,924 1,440 2,686 2,893 10,943 891 11,834 -736 2,614
1989-90 3,577 666 1,990 2,121 1,249 4,053 13,656 4,405 1,496 2,962 3,478 12,341 859 13,200 -456 2,158
1990-91 3,901 608 2,010 2,096 1,171 4,451 14,236 4,920 1,669 3,812 3,682 14,083 927 15,010 774 2,932
1991-92 4,013 577 1,991 2,198 1,101 4,690 14,570 5,503 1,994 4,171 4,340 16,008 1,093 17,101 2,531 5,463
1992-93 4,212 545 2,101 2,416 1,260 5,638 16,172 5,884 2,366 4,399 3,914 16,563 1,295 17,858 1,686 7,149
1993-94 4,477 719 2,661 2,269 1,772 6,025 17,923 6,164 2,704 4,550 3,979 17,397 1,436 18,833 910 8,059
1994-95 4,707 998 2,893 2,462 2,699 5,747 19,506 6,432 2,890 4,783 4,261 18,366 1,587 19,953 447 8,506
1995-96 4,993 1,225 2,999 2,394 2,026 6,060 19,698 6,614 3,033 4,951 3,829 18,427 1,627 20,054 356 8,863
1996-97 5,290 1,347 3,076 1,955 2,186 6,272 20,126 6,864 2,969 5,122 3,582 18,537 1,704 20,241 115 8,978
1997-98 5,362 1,138 3,243 1,837 2,197 6,439 20,216 7,050 3,048 5,125 3,228 18,451 1,684 20,135 -81 8,897
1998-99 5,423 1,098 3,209 2,150 1,830 6,603 20,312 7,304 3,113 5,367 3,269 19,053 1,474 20,527 215 9,112
1999-00 5,824 939 3,338 2,687 2,517 6,531 21,836 7,888 3,093 5,469 4,199 20,649 1,508 22,157 321 9,433
2000-01 5,963 1,055 3,617 2,752 3,750 6,812 23,948 8,597 3,212 5,840 3,414 21,063 1,608 22,671 -1,277 8,156
2001-02 5,375 1,522 3,535 2,735 3,108 6,712 22,987 9,733 3,318 6,336 4,103 23,490 1,487 24,977 1,990 10,146
2002-03 4,154 613 3,770 3,276 3,255 7,137 22,205 10,258 3,019 6,370 4,075 23,722 1,442 25,164 2,959 13,105
2003-04 4,878 776 3,989 2,987 3,273 7,506 23,408 10,535 2,715 6,356 4,418 24,024 1,453 25,477 2,069 15,174
2004-05 5,051 1,256 4,099 4,562 3,938 8,657 27,562 10,685 2,570 6,447 5,190 24,892 1,414 26,306 -1,256 13,918
2005-06 5,838 1,428 4,326 5,018 4,527 8,574 29,711 11,583 2,670 6,710 4,893 25,855 1,319 27,174 -2,537 11,381
2006-07 6,908 1,540 4,673 5,383 3,941 9,060 31,506 12,329 2,862 7,010 4,986 27,188 1,318 28,506 -3,000 8,381
2007-08 6,959 2,253 5,086 4,950 3,699 9,370 32,317 13,513 2,976 7,510 5,391 29,390 1,175 30,565 -1,752 6,629
2008-09 6,309 3,394 4,979 4,931 3,760 7,607 30,981 14,131 3,344 7,585 5,803 30,863 1,206 32,069 1,089 7,718
2009-10 5,769 1,624 4,801 5,349 2,560 9,065 29,169 14,531 3,528 7,713 5,361 31,133 1,177 32,310 3,141 10,859
2010-11 5,806 2,026 5,521 6,210 2,623 10,667 32,852 15,263 3,734 7,864 5,556 32,417 1,244 33,661 809 11,667
2011-12 6,427 2,002 5,841 6,213 2,699 10,200 33,382 16,251 3,894 7,959 6,959 35,064 1,238 36,302 2,920 14,587
2012-13 6,977 2,204 5,975 5,592 2,348 10,267 33,363 16,580 3,917 8,001 5,425 33,923 1,197 35,120 1,757 16,344



















































1980-81 184 44 247 694 19 216 1,404 301 143 379 466 1,289 202 1,491 87 1,891
1981-82 213 45 257 782 26 229 1,552 353 160 433 520 1,466 234 1,700 148 2,039
1982-83 254 35 273 855 22 277 1,716 415 184 482 558 1,638 269 1,907 191 2,230
1983-84 247 34 328 914 21 285 1,829 457 206 593 596 1,852 303 2,155 326 2,556
1984-85 252 41 346 986 19 302 1,946 468 222 522 635 1,846 352 2,198 252 2,808
1985-86 265 60 373 1,062 19 358 2,137 492 248 545 698 1,983 407 2,390 253 3,061
1986-87 283 65 418 1,157 27 333 2,283 534 279 563 702 2,078 436 2,514 231 3,292
1987-88 336 73 468 1,218 29 421 2,546 620 263 632 771 2,286 457 2,743 197 3,490
1988-89 356 57 522 1,315 20 394 2,664 621 302 677 836 2,436 454 2,890 226 3,715
1989-90 407 57 565 1,426 22 455 2,931 663 331 703 950 2,647 459 3,106 175 3,890
1990-91 455 53 558 1,398 21 482 2,967 739 385 759 942 2,824 490 3,314 347 4,238
1991-92 468 49 562 1,427 20 582 3,108 748 418 760 962 2,888 496 3,384 276 4,514
1992-93 476 46 539 1,500 15 617 3,194 774 437 787 969 2,967 488 3,455 261 4,775
1993-94 506 39 539 1,462 15 597 3,158 786 449 799 830 2,864 500 3,364 205 4,980
1994-95 476 53 563 1,637 18 641 3,388 804 465 713 1,016 2,998 532 3,530 142 5,122
1995-96 554 63 565 1,451 26 829 3,487 913 366 717 571 2,567 545 3,112 -375 4,747
1996-97 618 63 556 1,499 22 663 3,420 904 367 693 567 2,531 544 3,075 -345 4,401
1997-98 543 78 433 2,019 21 904 4,000 1,034 380 708 1,009 3,131 865 3,996 -4 4,398
1998-99 545 83 438 1,834 26 870 3,795 1,280 293 761 798 3,131 1,008 4,139 344 4,742
1999-00 605 84 456 1,620 39 951 3,755 1,382 275 800 827 3,285 883 4,168 413 5,155
2000-01 625 75 498 1,757 60 885 3,901 1,477 280 788 885 3,430 951 4,382 481 5,636
2001-02 607 55 556 1,657 52 973 3,900 1,558 275 822 917 3,572 942 4,514 614 6,250
2002-03 671 109 590 1,589 97 893 3,950 1,659 273 837 996 3,765 979 4,744 795 7,045
2003-04 733 140 625 1,543 144 1,009 4,194 1,798 390 978 985 4,151 982 5,133 939 7,983
2004-05 767 172 595 1,513 271 995 4,312 1,825 371 906 931 4,032 940 4,972 660 8,644
2005-06 811 296 630 1,880 555 1,206 5,378 1,867 363 1,156 1,023 4,409 947 5,356 -21 8,622
2006-07 886 342 686 1,743 545 1,139 5,340 1,990 372 1,107 1,121 4,590 777 5,367 27 8,649
2007-08 804 484 686 1,788 2,031 1,150 6,942 2,137 382 1,188 1,262 4,969 751 5,720 -1,222 7,427
2008-09 900 520 758 2,558 2,455 1,236 8,427 2,347 414 1,304 1,472 5,537 745 6,282 -2,145 5,282
2009-10 817 595 704 1,545 2,206 1,238 7,106 2,620 530 1,452 1,837 6,439 890 7,329 224 5,506
2010-11 887 533 800 1,763 2,628 1,317 7,928 2,665 568 1,400 2,069 6,702 837 7,539 -388 5,118
2011-12 1,012 503 873 1,594 3,112 1,448 8,543 2,846 574 1,492 2,136 7,048 789 7,838 -706 4,412
2012-13 1,159 767 941 992 1,964 1,442 7,265 2,844 584 1,484 2,008 6,921 780 7,701 436 4,848



















































1980-81 393 128 300 426 788 21 2,056 540 239 447 800 2,026 22 2,048 -8 -1,193
1981-82 512 93 317 535 759 200 2,416 614 319 500 932 2,365 43 2,408 -8 -1,201
1982-83 683 87 312 417 776 248 2,524 729 444 589 1,018 2,780 42 2,822 298 -904
1983-84 565 132 340 558 758 252 2,605 961 302 645 1,019 2,927 57 2,983 378 -526
1984-85 554 121 345 598 866 309 2,793 1,012 328 636 1,151 3,128 102 3,230 437 -89
1985-86 628 129 374 652 769 395 2,947 1,067 341 677 1,297 3,382 190 3,572 625 536
1986-87 692 119 357 799 305 396 2,668 1,165 356 701 1,557 3,779 193 3,972 1,304 1,840
1987-88 769 124 455 923 458 442 3,171 1,184 378 780 1,172 3,514 282 3,796 625 2,465
1988-89 848 128 499 1,074 356 705 3,609 1,249 364 810 1,232 3,656 320 3,976 367 2,832
1989-90 899 108 502 1,231 352 948 4,040 1,401 363 848 1,361 3,973 523 4,496 455 3,287
1990-91 980 66 518 1,489 417 1,131 4,601 1,531 367 897 1,726 4,521 475 4,996 395 3,683
1991-92 1,023 75 578 1,260 325 788 4,049 1,581 390 908 1,510 4,389 502 4,892 842 4,525
1992-93 1,075 92 539 1,304 396 970 4,376 1,548 425 904 1,350 4,228 740 4,968 592 5,117
1993-94 1,068 146 666 1,248 452 1,100 4,680 1,464 552 864 1,198 4,078 873 4,952 272 5,389
1994-95 1,057 162 729 1,297 718 1,262 5,225 1,534 576 902 1,204 4,215 882 5,097 -128 5,261
1995-96 1,111 238 779 975 673 1,355 5,132 1,555 587 880 1,243 4,264 849 5,113 -18 5,242
1996-97 1,277 232 841 761 908 1,485 5,503 1,608 587 882 1,225 4,302 794 5,096 -407 4,835
1997-98 1,328 217 753 553 781 1,530 5,162 1,677 600 917 1,179 4,373 755 5,127 -35 4,800
1998-99 1,448 200 743 961 622 1,629 5,604 1,775 636 978 1,442 4,830 745 5,575 -29 4,771
1999-00 1,446 277 660 1,209 932 1,334 5,857 1,962 580 1,034 1,502 5,077 696 5,773 -84 4,687
2000-01 1,255 317 758 872 1,293 2,259 6,754 2,098 577 1,113 1,469 5,257 664 5,921 -833 3,854
2001-02 1,197 145 776 1,238 825 1,879 6,059 2,204 624 1,092 1,801 5,721 617 6,338 279 4,133
2002-03 1,430 178 814 801 1,244 1,990 6,457 2,343 681 1,069 1,670 5,762 611 6,374 -83 4,050
2003-04 1,246 311 854 1,033 1,141 1,974 6,558 2,516 681 1,228 1,741 6,166 603 6,768 210 4,260
2004-05 1,329 258 985 1,666 1,474 2,079 7,792 2,774 679 1,273 1,722 6,448 579 7,027 -765 3,495
2005-06 1,448 394 1,112 1,265 1,721 2,277 8,218 2,991 693 1,462 1,988 7,133 545 7,678 -539 2,956
2006-07 1,669 554 1,080 1,389 1,694 2,258 8,643 3,203 821 1,606 2,077 7,707 538 8,245 -398 2,558
2007-08 1,938 674 930 1,603 2,640 2,081 9,866 3,504 733 1,562 2,237 8,036 547 8,583 -1,283 1,275
2008-09 1,844 592 1,109 1,709 4,612 2,459 12,325 3,976 790 2,113 2,955 9,835 520 10,355 -1,970 -695
2009-10 1,891 881 1,084 1,604 1,911 2,896 10,266 3,934 860 2,095 2,730 9,619 480 10,099 -168 -862
2010-11 1,796 1,155 1,187 1,600 2,528 2,795 11,061 4,548 911 2,197 2,886 10,541 424 10,965 -95 -958
2011-12 1,897 794 1,322 1,726 2,822 2,559 11,120 4,400 902 2,330 3,021 10,654 412 11,066 -55 -1,012
2012-13 2,406 838 1,285 1,671 2,516 2,708 11,424 4,576 964 2,448 3,030 11,018 391 11,409 -16 -1,028
2013-14 2,470 1,017 1,326 1,617 2,521 2,491 11,442 4,835 961 2,572 2,963 11,331 328 11,659 217 -812
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